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Recent events-current events-have agitated a simmering
constitutional controversy in the United States, the distribution
of war powers between Congress and the President. They have
also agitated-awakened-issues of international law, so long
dormant that few of us recognize them. In the Gulf Crisis and
the Gulf War, the two sets of issues, the constitutional and the
international, have become fused, confused.
Despite recurrent political flurries of constitutional dimen-
sion during the past fifteen-twenty years, even students of con-
t The fourth annual Blaine Sloan Lecture was delivered on February 12, 1991.
Presented in honor of Blaine Sloan, Professor Emeritus of International Law and
Organization at Pace University, the lecture series is delivered each year to the
University and Law School community in order to promote scholarly debate in
international law.
tt University Professor Emeritus, Columbia University.
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stitutional law have not been at home among the constitutional
issues of foreign affairs and war powers. Students of interna-
tional law, for their part, had dismissed a crucial chapter of the
United Nations Charter as academic and hypothetical, during
the forty (out of forty-five) years in which the Cold War had
paralyzed the United Nations collective security system. The
confluence of constitutional and international legal issues during
the Gulf Crisis has found both constitutional and international
lawyers largely at sea.
In these pages I address-briefly-the legal issues of the
Gulf Crisis through the following sets of questions.
What is the distribution of authority between Congress and
the President under the Constitution, as it relates to war or other
uses of force against other nations?
In light of those constitutional allocations of authority, did
the President require Congressional authorization to send forces
of the United States into war in the Gulf?
What is the authority of the United Nations Security Council
under the United Nations Charter, and what are the rights, re--
sponsibilities and obligations of the United States under the
Charter and in respect of Security Council resolutions?
Did the Security Council have authority to adopt resolutions
imposing sanctions against Iraq, authorizing United Nations
members to enforce those sanctions, and later to use force to lib-
erate Kuwait? Did the United States have the right, or perhaps
even the obligation, pursuant to the several Security Council reso-
lutions, to impose economic sanctions against Iraq; to monitor
and enforce United Nations sanctions against violations by other
states; to send military forces into the Gulf and to initiate mili-
tary force against Iraqi forces in Kuwait and Iraq?
Do the rights, responsibilities and obligations of the United
States under the United Nations Charter modify the normal dis-
tribution of authority between Congress and the President under
the Constitution?
Did the President have authority to impose sanctions against
Iraq pursuant to the Security Council resolutions, and did the
subsequent Security Council resolutions relieve the President of
any obligation he may have had under the Constitution to obtain
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Congressional authorization to deploy forces to implement United
Nations sanctions, and later to pursue war against Iraq?
Some of these legal questions about United States responses
to the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait were mooted by resolu-
tions of the Security Council' and Congress.2 It seems fruitful
nonetheless to consider those issues now, in comparative tran-
quility, when they are no longer the subject of case and contro-
versy. Other legal questions, under the Constitution and under
international law, remain in issue and may yet irrupt during the
aftermath of the Gulf Crisis. No doubt they will have interest
and significance for the future.
I. WAR POWERS-CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT'
The Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war.'
By that grant the Framers gave Congress the power to decide
whether the United States shall go to war or remain at peace.'
The Constitution also gives Congress the power to raise and sup-
port armies and to provide and maintain a navy, and to make
rules for the government and regulation of these forces.'
The Constitution designated the President as Commander-
in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States.7 By that
clause, the Framers sought to give effect to lessons learned dur-
ing the recent Revolutionary War: They reaffirmed civilian con-
See U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/
662 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES664 (1990); U.N. Doc. S1RES/665 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/
RES/666 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/667 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/669 (1990); U.N. Doc.
S/RES/670 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/677 (1990); U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (1990). For summaries of these resolutions, see Appendix.
2 H.J. Res. 77, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. 443 (1991).
' I draw here on previous writings, principally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION chs. 2-4 (1972) [hereinafter FOREIGN AFFAIRS]; Henkin, The Constitution
and Foreign Affairs, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1987-88, at 284; L. HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL-
ism, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS ch. 1 (1990). See also L. Henkin, Testimony before
the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Regarding the President's Au-
thority to use Force Without Congressional Authorization (January 8, 1991) (forthcom-
ing) [hereinafter Testimony before the United States Senate].
SU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
' See, e.g., Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (Marshall, C.J.); Brown
v. United States, 8 U.S. (1 Cranch) 110, 145, 147, 149 & 152-4 (1814) (Story, J.,
dissenting).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-14.
7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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trol of the military forces; they established a single unified com-
mand of the armed forces (rather than command by
"committee," as under the Continental Congress).8
The dispositions of the Constitution seem clear and beyond
dispute. The Constitution gave the President no authority to
raise and support an army; it gave him no authority to take the
country to war. If Congress decided to raise, support and main-
tain an army and navy, the President would be their Com-
mander. If Congress declared war, or otherwise decided for war,
the President would command the armed forces in that war.
At the Constitutional Convention, the Framers recognized a
single exception: the President had authority to engage in war to
defend the United States if it were attacked. In those circum-
stances there was no decision to be made: the United States
would be at war as the result of enemy action. That, in those
circumstances, Congress authorized the President to fight the
war went without saying.
Slowly, during the past 200 years, Presidents began to assert
constitutional power to deploy forces of the United States
abroad for various purposes on their own authority.9 In general,
Presidents did not purport to derive that power from their au-
thority as Commander-in-Chief but principally from other pow-
ers-from their duty to take care that the laws of the United
States be faithfully executed; 10 from power, as executive, to im-
plement treaties of the United States; principally, from author-
ity to conduct the foreign relations of the United States." The
President had begun to assert authority to "make U.S. foreign
policy," at least as early as Washington's Neutrality Proclama-
tion (1793)12 and the Monroe Doctrine (1823). Slowly, perhaps
ineluctably, the President acquired a general "Foreign Affairs
Power," in some respects independent of Congress. Repeatedly,
See Hamilton, The Federalist Nos. 68, 69, in THE FEDERALIST 457, 462 (Cooke ed.
1961) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST].
9 See infra note 14.
10 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
" This authority is implied in the President's power to appoint Ambassadors (with
the consent of the Senate) and to receive foreign Ambassadors. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-
3. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 45-50.
" Proclamation of Neutrality, No. 65, ASP, Foreign Relations I, 140, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1793), reprinted in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 430-31 (J. Fitzpat-
rick ed. 1939).
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Congress confirmed the President's "plenary" foreign affairs
power by ratification or acquiescence and added to it by express
delegation. 13
In time, the President began to combine his different
"hats," putting the forces which he commanded as Commander-
in-Chief at the disposal of the policy he determined under his
executive power or his foreign affairs power. Sometimes forces
deployed under such Presidential authority engaged in or be-
came involved in hostilities. Depending on what one considers a
deployment and how one defines hostilities, there have been
more than 200 such instances in which the forces of the United
States were engaged in hostilities without advance authorization
by Congress.'" With the exception of United States participation
in the United Nations action in Korea (1950-53), however, these
engagements were not properly "war"under the Constitution or
under international law. With the exception of President Tru-
man in respect of Korea, no President claimed authority to go to
war without authorization by Congress. 5
The Korean War was the high-water mark for claims of
Presidential war power and in that case Congress acquiesced in
and ratified the President's action.1 6 After the searing experience
of the United States in Vietnam, however, Congress, in the War
Powers Resolution of 1973, moved to reassert its constitutional
authority.'7
A. Korea
The Korean War (1950-1953) is of particular pertinence to
the constitutional issues engendered by the Persian Gulf Crisis.
In 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. The United
3 See FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 37-38. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), the Court spoke of "the very delicate, plenary
and exclusive power of the President as sole organ of the federal government in the field
of international relations."
" For a list of these deployments see 137 CONG. REC. S130-135, (daily ed. Jan. 10,
1991).
" Perhaps President Reagan can be seen as having claimed such power in invading
Grenada and President Bush may have claimed that power in invading Panama. In both
cases the actions were limited and brief, substantially short of war, but both were doubt-
less subject to the War Powers Resolution.
' See FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 345-46 & n. 27. See infra notes 21-23.
See infra note 21.
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States led efforts in the United Nations Security Council to con-
demn the aggression and to mobilize resistance to it. The Secur-
ity Council recommended that states come to the assistance of
South Korea and that those doing so place their forces under a
Unified Command led by the United States. Pursuant to those
Security Council recommendations, President Truman ordered
forces of the United States to help defend South Korea. Appar-
ently, he claimed authority to do so from the President's power
to carry out undertakings by the United States in the United
Nations Charter, a treaty of the United States. 8
President Truman did not request authority from Congress.
Congress, controlled by the President's political party, did not
seem significantly concerned over the Presidential initiative
though it was without precedent and implied claims of new, ma-
jor Presidential power at the expense of Congress. In modest de-
bate, Congress supported the President's action, but apparently
saw no need to provide a declaration of war or other formal au-
thorization. The Republicans, the minority party in both houses
of Congress, did not oppose the action in Korea. Senator Taft
did question the President's constitutional authority but made
little of it, and his constitutional strictures were largely over-
whelmed in partisan controversy about United States foreign
policy in the Far East generally.19
In the case of Korea, Congress promptly indicated full sup-
port for the Presidential action. Within days Congress appropri-
ated funds for the conduct of the war. Soon it extended the Se-
lective Service Act.2 0 President Truman, I shall suggest, did not
have constitutional authority to go to war when he did, but Con-
gress immediately ratified his actions.2
B. The Relevance of the Vietnam War
In the 1960's, the United States was again at war in Asia,
this time in Indochina. That war brought national malaise but
" I consider the merits of that claim below. See infra note 31 and accompanying
text.
.9 96 CONG. REC. 9320 (daily ed. June 28, 1950).
2 Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 621, 64 Stat. 373 (1950); Far
Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 447, 64 Stat. 5 (1950); Selective
Service Extension Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 599, 64 Stat. 318 (1950).
" See id. On the effects of ratification, see Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 647 (1862).
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no constitutional crisis and little constitutional controversy. In
1964, in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Congress resolved that it
"approves and supports the determination of the President as
Commander-in-Chief to take all necessary measures to repel any
armed attack against the forces of the United States and to pre-
vent further aggression."'22 Later some questioned the constitu-
tional sufficiency of that authorization to support full-fledged
war, but there was little basis for claiming that Presidents had
usurped Congressional authority. Congress may have been fool-
ish, even reckless, but it had given the President a "blank
check" to engage in hostilities, including war.
C. The War Powers Resolution
Though Congress had authorized the war, later, when the
war went badly, many in Congress felt that they had been mis-
led. When, following "non-victory" in Vietnam and the coinci-
dence of the Watergate scandal, the Presidency was on the de-
fensive, Congress decided to reassert its constitutional authority
over war and peace. In 1973 Congress adopted the War Powers
Resolution, and upheld it over President Nixon's veto. 3
The War Powers Resolution began by setting forth Con-
gress' view of Presidential power under the Constitution. Con-
gress declared that the President had power to introduce forces
of the United States into hostilities (or "into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances") only if Congress authorized it by declaration of
war or by statute, or in time of emergency occasioned by an at-
tack on the United States ("or its armed forces").24 In subse-
quent sections of the Resolution, Congress required the Presi-
dent "in every possible instance" to consult Congress before
introducing forces into hostilities; to report any such engage-
ment of forces; and to terminate such engagement after 60 days
unless Congress acted to authorize the President to continue.25
22 H.J.Res. 1145, 73 Stat. 384 (1964), § 1.
23 87 Stat. 555, Public Law 93-148, 93rd Cong. (H.J.Res. 542, adopted over a veto by
President Nixon on Nov. 7, 1973). See Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 311 PuB.
PAPERS 893 (1973) (President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.J.
Res. 542 Without His Approval. Oct. 24, 1973).
4 War Powers Resolution § 2(c).
2" Id. at § 5(b). The President's authority is extended to 90 days if the President
1991]
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Congress also asserted the right to terminate any such engage-
ment by "legislative veto," by a concurrent resolution not re-
quiring the President's approval.2 6 In addition, doubtless with a
view in particular to the United Nations Charter and the North
Atlantic Treaty, the War Powers Resolution declared that no
treaty of the United States shall be interpreted as authorizing
the President to introduce forces of the United States into hos-
tilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostili-
ties is indicated by the circumstances, without authorization
from Congress.2 7
Presidents have repeatedly challenged the constitutionality
of the War Powers Resolution, but they have not told us why it
is unconstitutional.28 The legislative veto provision of the Reso-
lution (like other such provisions in Congressional legislation)
may indeed have been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court's sweeping decision in Chadha.29 For the rest, though the
War Powers Resolution has many defects, I see no serious con-
stitutional objection to its principal provisions as applied to hos-
tilities that constitute war. Congress has the power to decide
whether the United States shall (or shall not) go to war; the
President has no independent constitutional authority to go to
war. At most, by repeated practice and Congressional acquies-
cence, the President may have acquired authority to deploy the
armed forces for foreign policy purposes short of war. But as
regards hostilities that constitute war within the meaning of the
Constitution-war as understood in international law-the Con-
stitution is clear, and history has not eroded its mandate. Con-
gress has the war power; the President may not take the United
certifies that military necessity respecting the safety of the armed forces requires it. Id.
" Id. at § 5(c).
27 Id. at § 8.
's In his message to the House of Representatives explaining his veto of the War
Powers Resolution, see supra note 23, President Nixon remarked:
House Joint Resolution 542 would attempt to take away, by mere legislative
act, authorities which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution
for almost 200 years . ...
[T]he only way in which the constitutional powers of a branch of the Govern-
ment can be altered is by amending the Constitution-and any attempt to make
such alterations by legislation alone is clearly without force.
President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.J. Res. 542 Without
His Approval, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1286 (Oct. 24, 1983).
29 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982).
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States into war. Surely, then, Congress can forbid the President
to go to war without authorization by Congress. By its exclusive
authority over war-or-peace, Congress, I believe, can also pro-
hibit the President from deploying forces of the United States
into situations where their "imminent involvement" in war "is
clearly indicated by the circumstances." Congress, I believe, can
also decide that hostilities short of war might lead to war and
can regulate such hostilities as well.
I sum up. The Constitution in terms that can leave little
room for doubt gave the President no authority to take the
country into war. Without exception, the Framers, including
those most strongly in favor of a powerful executive, never
claimed for him any power to go to war.3 0 History may have
given the President some authority to deploy the forces of the
United States for foreign policy purposes short of war; it has not
given Presidents any authority to go to war. If the President has
acquired authority to deploy forces for purposes short of war
when Congress is silent, history has given him no such authority
where Congress has prohibited it.
Except in Korea, no President has ever claimed authority to
take the United States into war on his own authority. Even in
Korea, the President's claim was based not on any alleged inde-
pendent Presidential power to go to war but on his authority to
carry out responsibilities under the United Nations Charter, a
treaty of the United States.3 1 In Korea, Congress acquiesced in
and ratified a Presidential war.3 2 Some twenty-three years later,
in the War Powers Resolution, Congress, in effect, rejected the
authority claimed by the President in Korea and decided that
there shall be no such Presidential wars in the future, even in
response to treaty responsibilities of the United States.
In the Persian Gulf in January 1991, military action by the
United States to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation was
surely war for constitutional purposes. The President had no au-
30 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 8, No. 69 at 417-18.
The Executive Branch of recent years, often invoking "original intent" as the proper
basis for constitutional interpretation, has been remarkably silent about the intent of the
Framers as to the allocation of war powers.
31 See 96 CONG. REC. 10781 (H. Doc. 646) (July 19, 1950) (President Truman's report
to Congress on the Korean situation).
32 See supra notes 19 & 21-23.
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thority to take the country into such war without authorization
by Congress. However, on January 12, 1991, Congress gave the
President authority to take the United States to war when it
authorized him "to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to
United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order
to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660,
661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677.
' 33
II. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE GULF WAR
The Congressional Resolution of January 1991 in effect au-
thorized the President to take the United States to war against
Iraq in order to liberate Kuwait. The President had insisted that
such authorization from Congress was not constitutionally nec-
essary and he had clearly been reluctant to request it. When
persuaded to request Congressional support and approval, he
was apparently careful not to imply that he required them as a
matter of constitutional principle.34 He claimed that he had au-
thority to go to war in the Gulf as Commander-in-Chief; some
claimed he had such authority by virtue of the resolutions of the
United Nations Selcurity Council.35 I have indicated that in my
view he did not have the necessary authority apart from the Se-
curity Council resolutions; in my view, the resolutions of the Se-
curity Council did not serve to confer such constitutional
authority.
Following the Iraqi armed attack on Kuwait, the United
Nations Security Council adopted a series of resolutions. In
brief, these resolutions condemned Iraqi aggression and ordered
Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait; decided that members
of the United Nations should impose economic sanctions against
Iraq; authorized member states to use necessary means to en-
force those sanctions; authorized member states, if Iraq did not
withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991, to use all necessary
means to terminate the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
36
There can be little doubt as to the authority of the Security
" 2 H.J. Res. 77, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. 443 (1991).
"' Statement by the President-the White House-Office of the Press Secretary,
Fed. News Serv., Jan. 14, 1991.
" See Testimony before the United States Senate, supra note 3.
36 Id. .
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Council to adopt any of the above resolutions. But understand-
ing the authority of the Security Council, and precisely what the
Security Council resolved, will contribute to understanding the
rights, responsibilities and obligations of the United States
under those resolutions and their implications for the constitu-
tional authority of the President in respect of those resolutions.
A. Security Council Authority Under Chapter VII
By adhering to the United Nations Charter member states
assume important legal obligations. Member states are legally
bound to refrain from the threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of other states, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.3 1 Members of the United Nations confer on the Secur-
ity Council primary responsibility for maintaining international
peace and security, and agree that in doing so the Security
Council acts on their behalf. 8 United Nations members agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in ac-
cordance with the Charter.39
I do not address here the authority of the Security Council
under Chapter VI of the Charter as regards the Pacific Settle-
ment of Disputes. In the Gulf Crisis, the Security Council exer-
cised its authority under Chapter VII to take action with respect
to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression.
It is important to understand the authority of the Security
Council and what the Security Council did. Article 39 provides
that the Council "shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore in-
ternational peace and security."'40
That language is careful and purposeful. The Council may
make recommendations, but it may also decide on measures in
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
38 Id. at art. 24, para. 1.
Id. at art. 25.
40 Id. at art. 39.
1991]
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accordance with Articles 41 and 42.41 Recommendations are no
doubt entitled to great weight, but they do not create legal obli-
gations; decisions are mandatory and create legal obligations.
Under Article 41 the Security Council may decide what
measures not involving the use of armed force-interruption of
economic relations and communication, severance of diplomatic
relations-are to be employed, and may call upon (order) mem-
bers to apply such measures. 42 Such decisions are mandatory, le-
gally binding obligations. If these are inadequate, the Security
Council, under Article 42, "may take such action by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. Such action may include demonstra-
tions, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces
of Members of the United Nations."
So much seems clear. Uncertainties arise as a result of Arti-
cle 43. That article provides that:
All Members . . . undertake to make available to the Secur-
ity Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement
or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities including
rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining inter-
national peace and security.
The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as
possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be
concluded between the Security Council and Members or between
the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject
to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their re-
spective constitutional processes.
It seems clear that the Charter contemplated that the Se-
curity Council might take action under Article 42 by using forces
provided by members under Article 43. But Article 43 agree-
ments have never been concluded. The obligation to do so "as
soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council" has
been dormant; during the long sleep of the Cold War the Secur-
ity Council was unable to take the necessary initiative. Perhaps
now, if the Cold War is indeed ended, it may be possible for the
Council to take such initiative, but pending the conclusion of
41 Id.
42 Id. at art. 41. For the ambiguity of "calls upon," see infra note 47.
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Article 43 agreements there are no Article 43 forces which the
Security Council could order into action. How does that affect
the powers of the Security Council under Article 42? Can the
Security Council "take action" under Article 42 "by air, sea, or
land forces of Members of the United Nations," other than
forces provided under Article 43 agreements, at least when such
agreements have not been concluded? And if indeed the Council
can take such action, can the Council only recommend that
member states provide forces for such a United Nations action,
or can the Council decide, order member states to do so?
Reading Chapter VII as a whole, I conclude that the Secur-
ity Council can decide on mandatory measures not involving the
use of armed force; that it can decide on mandatory military
measures with national forces provided by member states pursu-
ant to Article 43 agreements; that in the absence of such agree-
ments the Security Council, under Article 42, cannot decide that
member states must provide forces for Security Council action,
but the Council can "take action" by authorizing, recom-
mending, or requesting member states to use force to maintain
or restore international peace and security.
My conclusion that, in the absence of Article 43 agreements,
the Security Council can recommend that states take military
action or can authorize them to do so, but cannot direct them to
do so, is supported by history, a meager history. The Security
Council has never purported to order states to send troops for
Security Council action. In two cases, forty years apart-in Ko-
rea 43 and in the Gulf, 4 -the Council has only recommended or
authorized such action.
B. Security Council Action in the Persian Gulf
The Gulf Crisis found the Security Council resorting to its
powers under Chapter VII of the Charter to restore interna-
tional peace and security in the absence of Article 43 agreements
and Article 43 military forces. The Security Council determined
that there had been a breach of international peace and security
by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.45 The Council decided that there
41 U.N. Doc. S/RES/83 (1950).
44 S/RES/678.
45 S/RES/660.
1991]
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shall be an embargo and other economic sanctions against Iraq
and called upon all member states to apply them."0 The Council
called upon "Member States co-operating with the Government
of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use
such measures commensurate to the specific circumstance as
may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to
halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order . . . to
ensure strict implementation" of the embargo provisions laid
down by the Security Council.4 7 In that resolution the Council
also requested "all States to provide in accordance with the
Charter such assistance as may be required" by the states moni-
toring compliance with the embargo. 8 Finally, the Council au-
thorized "Member States co-operating with the Government of
Kuwait. . . to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
the relevant Security Council resolutions and to restore interna-
tional peace and security in the area."'"
C. Collective Security or Collective Self-Defense
I have suggested that the Security Council resolution au-
thorizing the use of force against Iraq constitutes an appropriate
"action" by the Council under Article 42, "as may be necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security." It was
an action in support of collective security, but it was not (and
probably could not properly be) a mandatory decision: States
were authorized to use force; they were not legally bound to do
SO.
Another perspective might give the Security Council resolu-
tions a somewhat different cast, with somewhat different legal
implications. One may see the series of resolutions as an action
by the Council under Article 42 confirming and supporting ac-
tion by states acting in self-defense or in collective self-defense
pursuant to Article 51.
Article 51 provides that "Nothing 'in the present Charter
46 S/RES/661.
47 S/RES/665. "Calls upon" is ambiguous, sometimes purposefully so. In this case,
as a request to some states to use or risk force to secure the embargo against Iraq, I am
satisfied, "calls upon" is the equivalent of "requests" or "recommends."
48 Id.
49 S/RES/678.
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shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
United Nations." In August 1990, beyond doubt, Iraq committed
an armed attack upon Kuwait. If Kuwait declared itself a victim
of an armed attack and asked the United States to join it in
collective self-defense, the United States and Kuwait, and who-
ever else was invited and agreed to join them, had the legal right
to use military force against the Iraqi forces in Kuwait.50 They
could also use military force against Iraqi territory and against
Iraqi forces in that territory, as necessary to compel Iraq to
abandon its aggression against Kuwait. Although the right of
self-defense is, in principle, subject to limitations of necessity
and proportionality, it has been accepted that the state victim of
an armed attack (and invited allies) may wage full-scale war
against the aggressor, if only to prevent resumption or recur-
rence of the attack.5 1
Article 51 clearly contemplated that states may use force in
self-defense, or in collective self-defense, without having to await
authorization or other action by the Security Council. But that
article permits such use of force in self-defense "until the Secur-
ity Council has take measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security." As we know, that "until clause" has
been dormant during the forty years in which the Security
Council was incapacitated by the Cold War and there is no expe-
rience to help define the import of that clause.
Some have asked whether the Security Council has the au-
thority to terminate or supersede the inherent right of a state
victim of an armed attack to act in self-defense. The scheme of
the Charter suggests that the Security Council could do so, since
all members agreed to give the Security Council "primary re-
sponsibility for maintaining international peace and security,""2
and "to accept and carry out its decisions."53 In practice, it is
highly unlikely that the Security Council would preclude action
by the victim in self-defense. In some circumstances, however,
60 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America), 1986 I.C.J. 14, paras. 193-98 (Merits, Judgment).
" See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 141 (2nd ed. 1979).
62 U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
63 Id. at art. 25.
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the Security Council might decide to limit or regulate the use of
force even by the victim. Or the Council might decide not to
permit collective action in self-defense that might broaden the
conflict and further threaten international peace and security.
The Council might decide to preempt activities in self-defense
by subsuming or incorporating them in a United Nations action.
The authority of the Security Council to limit action in self-
defense became a pertinent issue for a time during the Gulf Cri-
sis. When the Security Council decided that the members of the
United Nations should impose sanctions against Iraq, and au-
thorized military measures to enforce those sanctions, some ar-
gued that the action of the Security Council terminated (or sus-
pended) the right of Kuwait and of other states to use force to
liberate Kuwait. In my view, the Security Council had authority
to do so; but did the Council in fact purport or intend to do so?
Are the relevant resolutions of the Security Council to be inter-
preted as decisions to rely exclusively on economic sanctions, at
least for a time, and to forbid military actions in collective self-
defense, or even by the victim of the armed attack?
In the Gulf, that question became moot when the Security
Council acted to authorize the use of force. But it remains a
question that may trouble collective action to maintain peace in
the future. Obviously the issue could be eliminated if the Secur-
ity Council considered and resolved whether any program of
sanctions it imposes should supersede or suspend the right to
use military force in self-defense or in collective self-defense.
Sometimes, however, it may not be politically possible or desira-
ble to resolve that issue.
The difference I am suggesting between a collective security
action and a collective self-defense action is suggested by differ-
ences between the Security Council resolutions on Korea in 1950
and those on Kuwait in 1990, and therefore between the Kuwait
action and that in Korea." In Korea, the Security Council rec-
ommended that states send forces to the aid of South Korea;"
in Kuwait the Security Council authorized the use of force." In
6' See U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (1950); U.N. Doc. S/RES/83 (1950); U.N. Doc. S/RES/84
(1950). See supra note 1.
55 S/RES/83.
56 S/RES/678.
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Korea, the Council recommendation was addressed to all states;
in Kuwait, though the call for economic sanctions was addressed
to all states, the authorization to use force speaks to "Member
States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait. '57 In Ko-
rea, the Security Council recommended that contributing states
place forces under a United Nations Command; the forces were
called United Nations forces; they fought under a United Na-
tions flag.58 In the Gulf there was no United Nations Command
or United Nations flag, and the forces of the "States co-operat-
ing with the Government of Kuwait" were referred to as "the
coalition." 59
In the Gulf, neither Kuwait nor those who agreed to come
to its support, nor the Security Council, expressly invoked Arti-
cle 51, and the Security Council resolutions speak words as con-
sistent with collective security as with collective self-defense.
But the failure to establish a United Nations force under a
United Nations Command, and the failure to recommend the ac-
tion authorized, suggests a collective self-defense action under
Article 51 rather than a United Nations collective security ac-
tion under Article 42. That distinction may have no major legal
consequences, and may reflect only uncertainty of commitment
to collective security in the very different world of 1990 as com-
pared to that of 1950. But in principla, and in the future, there
may be differences of some moment. Actions under Article 51
are under the control of the states acting in self-defense. The
Security Council, I have suggested, has authority to limit that
action, and surely to monitor its respect for principles of neces-
sity and proportionality, but the Security Council's control may
be looser both in law and in politics. Even in Kuwait the charac-
ter of the military action and the Security Council's relation to
it might have become important if the Security Council had
been pressed to terminate or regulate the action.
57 Id.
58 S/RES/84.
" See, e.g., S/RES/665.
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III. CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL
What have been the rights, obligations and responsibilities
of the United States under the Charter and under the resolu-
tions of the Security Council in the Persian Gulf Crisis? Did
such rights, obligations and responsibilities modify the distribu-
tion of authority between the President and Congress under the
United States Constitution?
A. Constitutional Authority and the U.N. Charter
The Charter is a treaty binding on the United States under
international law. Under the United States Constitution, the
Charter, as a treaty of the United States, is the law'of the land.60
The President has the duty to take care that laws be faithfully
executed:61 that includes also, I believe, a duty to take care that
treaties be faithfully carried out. Duty to act brings with it au-
thority (power) to do so.
Some obligations under the Charter may require implemen-
tation by Congress. Congress is internationally obligated, and
has the power under the Constitution, to enact laws necessary
and proper to carry out the obligations and responsibilities of
the United States under the United Nations Charter. The Presi-
dent has the responsibility of seeking such Congressional action;
he has the duty to see that such Congressional legislation is
faithfully executed.
Under the Charter, the United States is obligated to negoti-
ate Article 43 agreements. The President therefore is bound
(and has power) to negotiate such agreements. The United
States obligation to conclude such agreements might have served
to authorize the President to conclude them on his own author-
ity, had Article 43 not expressly provides that the obligation to
conclude the agreement is "subject to ratification by the signa-
tory states in accordance with their constitutional processes." 2
Even had the Charter itself, as a treaty of the United
80 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Id. at art. II, § 3.
02 U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 3. This provision was probably written into the Char-
ter to make it acceptable to the United States Senate.
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States, provided the President with power to conclude such
agreements on his own authority, Congress explicitly limited
that authority. The United Nations Participation Act of 1945
authorized the President to conclude Article 43 agreements but
explicitly provided that they should be subject to the consent of
Congress. 3 No President, then, has claimed, or could plausibly
claim, authority to carry out the obligation of the United States
to negotiate Article 43 agreements without the consent of
Congress."
B. Constitutional Authority in the Gulf Crisis
In the Gulf Crisis, the United States took two related but
legally discrete sets of action. It moved to defend Saudi Arabia
against possible attack; it pressed Iraq to evacuate Kuwait.
To defend Saudi Arabia, the United States deployed armed
forces to Saudi territory, with the consent of the Saudi Govern-
ment. That deployment raised no significant issues under inter-
national law but it raised questions of Presidential authority
under the Constitution. The President acted for the United
States on his own authority, without Congressional authoriza-
tion or approval. No doubt the President claimed authority from
the precedents established over 200 years by Presidential de-
ployment of armed forces in support of foreign policy purposes.
In the Gulf, forces were deployed in the first instance not to en-
gage in war but as a shield, for deterrent purposes. The Presi-
dent might even have argued that, since the United States de-
terrent was highly likely to be effective, such deployment was
not inconsistent with the War Powers Resolution since the
forces of the United States were not in fact put into a situation
"where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances. '' 15
The Constitutional authority of the President came into
question also as regards some of the actions taken by the United
" United Nations Participation Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 264, § 6, 59 Stat. 619, 621
(1945). The later word of Congress supersedes any treaty provision as effective law.
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1887).
" The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 requires the consent of Congress,
not of the Senate alone, but if the Senate gave consent to an Article 43 agreement con-
cluded as a treaty, that treaty would no doubt be valid.
" See supra note 24.
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States for the liberation of Kuwait. The United States took the
lead in developing the United Nations action, in obtaining the
adoption of successive Security Council Resolutions, and in im-
plementing and enforcing them. In accordance with Security
Council Resolution 661, the United States imposed an embargo
and other sanctions against Iraq. The United States was the
principal of "the Member States co-operating with Kuwait" 6
and deploying maritime forces to the area, and it used forcible
measures to enforce the embargo. After the Security Council's
deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait passed, the United
States led the use of force to liberate Kuwait as authorized by
the Security Council in Resolution 678.
As to most of these measures taken by the United States,
the President acted on his own authority. In my view, the Presi-
dent might plausibly claim that he had the duty, therefore the
authority, to carry out any mandatory, self-executing provisions
of the Charter, a treaty of the United States, as well as
mandatory resolutions of the Security Council, since the Charter
obligated the United States to heed such resolutions. Thus, for
example, the President could carry out mandatory decisions by
the Security Council under Article 41 calling upon member
states to apply measures not involving the use of armed force,
e.g., economic sanctions, interruption of communications, rup-
ture of diplomatic relations. 7
On the other hand, in my view, there is no basis for deriving
from the Charter any authority for the President to do on behalf
of the United States what the Security Council does not man-
date, but only authorizes or recommends. Thus, for example, it
is not clear that the Security Council has authority under the
Charter to order states to use the force necessary to make sanc-
tions effective. In any event, in the case of Iraq, the Security
Council did not do so: it only "called upon" 8 states to use the
necessary force to that end. It is doubtful whether the Security
Council has authority to order states to use armed forces (other
66 S/RES/678.
" That power, which the President might have claimed by virtue of his power to
execute the treaty, was in fact expressly confirmed by Congress in the United Nations
Participation Act. See United Nations Participation Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 264, § 5(a),
59 Stat. 619, 621 (1945).
as S/RES/678. See supra note 47.
[Vol. 3:1
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/1
CONGRESS AND THE UNITED NATIONS
than pursuant to Article 43 agreements) to undo aggression and
restore international peace and security; in any event, in Iraq
the Security Council did not do so; it authorized such force; it
did not even recommend it. There was then no international le-
gal obligation on the United States to carry out the resolution of
the Security Council "calling upon" it to use force to assure
compliance with the sanctions resolution, or the resolution au-
thorizing the United States to use force to liberate Kuwait. 9
There was, then, no duty on the President to take care that such
Security Council resolutions be executed. The President, then,
derived no authority from them or from the Charter to use force
for such purposes.
The President's power to use force on his own authority
would be no greater as regards military action by the United
States in collective self-defense with Kuwait. The United Na-
tions Charter permits action by states in collective self-defense
with a victim of an armed attack; Article 51 does not even rec-
ommend such action; surely it does not mandate it. There is no
legal obligation on the United States to come to the assistance of
a victim of an armed attack; there is, then, no international obli-
gation from which the President might claim to derive authority
to do so.
Congress apparently so interpreted the Charter at the time
it was adopted. The United Nations Participation Act authorizes
the President to carry out Security Council resolutions under
Article 41 that impose economic sanctions and other measures
not involving the use of force.70 The Participation Act author-
ized the President to negotiate Article 43 agreements but to con-
clude them only subject to Congressional consent.7 Congress ex-
pressly denied the President any authority to make forces
available to the Security Council other than pursuant to Article
43 agreements.7 Clearly, Congress did not think the President
:9 S/RES/678.
,0 See supra note 67.
" See supra note 63.
" Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 declares "[tihat noth-
ing herein contained shall be construed as an authorization to the President by the Con-
gress to make available to the Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities,
or assistance..." other than those provided pursuant to Article 43 Agreements. United
Nations Participation Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 264, § 7, 59 Stat. 619, 621 (1945). Con-
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had any constitutional authority of his own, or derived any au-
thority from the United Nations Charter, to make forces availa-
ble for war, whether for a Security Council action under Article
42, or for collective self-defense under Article 51.
President Truman's action in Korea, then, was unconstitu-
tional until ratified by Congress. President Bush's action would
have been unconstitutional had Congress not authorized it.
C. Failure to Respect International Obligations
I have been discussing constitutional authority to carry out
the obligations of the United States under the United Nations
Charter or under mandatory Security Council resolutions. Hav-
ing the power, however, Congress nonetheless might fail to enact
the necessary laws (or to appropriate funds), thereby putting the
United States in violation of those obligations. Or Congress
might adopt measures inconsistent with the obligations of the
United States; for example, it might make war in violation of the
United Nations Charter, or enact law contrary to a mandatory
Security Council resolution. The President will fight such wars
or enforce such laws and the courts will give them effect though
doing so would put the United States in violation of its interna-
tional obligations. 7 3
The matter is less clear as regards failures or violations
committed by the President. Although the treaty and other in-
ternational obligations are law of the land; although the Consti-
tution requires that the President take care that the laws be
faithfully executed, Presidents have sometimes failed to carry
out or have acted in violation of such obligations. The courts
have not deemed it appropriate to enjoin such Presidential vio-
lations where the President has constitutional power or statu-
tory authorization to take the action challenged.74 Thus, the
gress apparently did not consider the possibility that the President might wish to send
forces for collective self-defense. It is arguable that such forces too are made available to
the Security Council for its purposes under Article 42, and that Congress was refusing
the President that authority also.
7 See, e.g., Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See generally, Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1888); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1887).
7 Compare Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
289 (1986). See Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 883-4 (1987).
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courts will not enjoin the President from taking military action
that is deemed to be within his constitutional authority or has
been authorized by Congress, although such action might violate
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. They are not likely
to enjoin the President from violating sanctions mandated by
the Security Council under Article 41.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States took the lead in responding to Iraqi ag-
gression in the Gulf. Under international law, the United States
had the right to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia pursuant to an
invitation by the Saudi Government, and, under Article 51 of
the Charter, the United States could lawfully use force in collec-
tive self-defense if Saudi Arabia became a victim of an armed
attack and invited the United States to assist it. Under the Con-
stitution, however, the President could not engage in such war
without authorization from Congress.
As regards Kuwait, initially the United States might have
used force lawfully under Article 51 in collective self-defense
with Kuwait, if invited to do so. But with the passage of time,
and with the Security Council taking "measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security,"75 the authority of
the United States to use force to liberate Kuwait became ques-
tionable unless the Security Council authorized it; the Council
gave that authorization. Under the Constitution, the President
could send forces into war to liberate Kuwait only upon authori-
zation by Congress; he obtained it.7"
By seeking Congressional authorization, however reluc-
tantly, President Bush in fact helped Congress reassert its con-
stitutional authority. It will be easier for Congress to insist on
that authority in the future; it will be more difficult for Presi-
dents to usurp Congressional authority to decide for war or
peace in the future. Congress would do well to revise the War
Powers Resolution to clarify its requirements and make them
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
70 The Congressional resolution authorized the President to engage in war to carry
out the Security Council resolutions. The resolution can be deemed to authorize the
President also to engage in war to defend Saudi Arabia only if such defense was also
authorized by the Security Council resolutions.
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more realistic, to distinguish between war and deployments
short of war, and to authorize and assume responsibility for
some Presidential actions in some circumstances while prohibit-
ing others. I have little doubt of the Constitutional authority of
Congress to do so.
The Bush Administration acted in the Gulf Crisis from very
mixed motives. Whatever the motives, in fact President Bush
took a bold step in collective security. I hope that the United
States will exercise leadership in the United Nations to institu-
tionalize that step. That will require creative initiatives, in coop-
eration with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other
powers. 7 The United States should consider anew whether it is
desirable and politically feasible to return to the original plan
and negotiate Article 43 agreements, or to develop other ar-
rangements that will enable the United Nations to take collec-
tive measures to maintain or restore international peace and se-
curity. That would help deter aggression and other unilateral
uses of force, reduce the need to rely on individual or collective
self-defense, and move towards carrying out the determination
of the peoples of the United Nations "to save succeeding genera-
tions from the scourge of war.""8
7 It will also require that the United States itself eschew uses of force in violation
of the Charter, as in Panama. See, e.g., Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under Inter-
national Law, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. - (1991).
78 U.N. CHARTER preamble.
[Vol. 3:1
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/1
CONGRESS AND THE UNITED NATIONS
APPENDIX
The following passages represent the controlling provisions of
the United Nations Security Council's resolutions which resulted
from the Gulf Crisis.
U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 para. 2 (1990):
"Demand[ing] that Iraq withdraw immediately and uncondition-
ally all its forces to which they were located on 1 August 1990
U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 paras. 3, 4 (1990):
Decides that all states shall prevent:
(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and
products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom
after the date of the present resolution;
(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their terri-
tories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or prod-
ucts, including weapons or any other military equipment,
whether or not originating in their territories but not includ-
ing supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in
humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs . ...
Decides that all States shall not make available to the Govern-
ment of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public utility un-
dertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or
economic resources . .. except payments exclusively for strictly
medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circum-
stances, foodstuffs . ...
U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 para. 1 (1990):
Declaring "that [the] annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any
form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered
null and void . .. ."
U.N. Doc. S/RES/664 paras. 1, 2 (1990):
"Demand[ing] that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate de-
parture from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries
and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials of
such nationals . .. ."
Resolution 664 "further demands that Iraq take no action to jeop-
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ardize the safety, security or health of such nationals ... "
U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 para. 1 (1990):
Calls upon those Member States co-operating with the Govern-
ment of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area
to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances
as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council
to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to in-
spect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure
strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping
laid down in resolution 661 (1990) . ...
U.N. Doc. S/RES/666 para. 1 (1990):
Decides that in order to make the necessary determination
whether or not for the purposes of paragraph 3 (c) and paragraph
4 of resolution 661 (1990) humanitarian circumstances have
arisen, the Committee shall keep the situation regarding food-
stuffs in Iraq and Kuwait under constant review ..
U.N. Doc. S/RES/667 paras. 2-4 (1990):
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
Demands the immediate release of ... foreign nationals ..
Further demands that Iraq immediately and fully comply with its
international obligations under . .. the Vienna Conventions on
diplomatic and consular relations and international law ..
Further demands that Iraq immediately protect the safety and
well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in
Kuwait and in Iraq and take no action to hinder the diplomatic
and consular missions in the performance of their functions, in-
cluding access to their nationals and the protection of their per-
son and interests . ...
U.N. Doc. S/RES/669 (1990):
"Entrusts the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990)
concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait with the task
of examining requests for assistance under the provisions of Arti-
cle 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and making recom-
mendations to the President of the Security Council for appropri-
ate action . .. ."
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U.N. Doc. S/RES/670 paras. 3, 4 (1990):
Decides that all States, notwithstanding the existence of any
rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international
agreement or any contract entered into or any license or permit
granted before the date of the present resolution, shall deny per-
mission to any aircraft to take off from their territory if the air-
craft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait other than
food in humanitarian circumstances.
Decides further that all States shall deny permission to any air-
craft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait, whatever its State of
registration, to overfly its territory ....
U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 paras. 1, 5 (1990):
Demands that the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces immedi-
ately cease and desist from taking third-State nationals hostage,
mistreating and oppressing Kuwaiti and third-State nationals and
any other actions . . . that violate the decisions of this Council,
the Charter of the united Nations, the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Rela-
tions and international law ..
Demands that Iraq ensure the immediate access to food, water
and basic services necessary to the protection and well-being of
Kuwaiti nationals and of nationals of third States in Kuwait and
Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic nd consular missions
in Kuwait . ...
Doc. S/RES/677 para. 2 (1990):
"[M]andates the Security-General to take custody of a copy of
the population register of Kuwait, the authenticity of which has
been certified by the legitimate Government of Kuwait and which
covers the registration of the population up to 1 August 1990
U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 para. 2 (1990):
Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of
Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully imple-
ments. . . the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to
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uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent
relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and secur-
ity in the area ....
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